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Proxy Consent to Human Experimentation 
William E. May 
A frequent contributor to Lin-
acre, Dr. May is associate profes-
sor of moral theology at The 
Catholic University of America. 
He is the author of Becoming Hu-
man: An Invitation to Christian 
Ethics. 
A cardinal principle of medical 
ethics is that calling for free and 
informed consent in all types of 
experimental situations in which 
a human being is the subject of 
the experimentation. This prin-
ciple was eloquently affirmed in 
the articles of the Nuremberg 
Code, I in the 1964 Declaration of 
Helsinki of the World Health Or-
ganization,2 in the code of the 
American Medical Association 
adopted at the 1966 convention,1 
and in the "Ethical and Religious 
Directives for Catholic Hospi-
tals."4 It is a principle at the 
heart of traditional Jewish and 
Christian medical ethics, and is a 
principle time and again affirmed 
by the magisterium of the Roman 
Catholic Church. ·i It is, as Paul 
Ramsey terms it, a primary "can-
on of loyalty" demanding the al-
legiance of every human being in 
every situation in which one hu-
man being is the experimenter 
and the other his "co-adventurer" 
in the experiment.6 
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At the heart of this principle, 
I believe, is the belief that human 
beings are beings of moral worth. 
By a being of moral worth I 
mean an entity that is the subject 
of inalienable rights that are to 
be recognized by other entities 
capable of recognizing rights and 
that demand legal protection by 
society. By a being of moral worth 
I mean an entity that is valuable, 
precious, irreplaceable just be-
cause it exists. By a being of 
moral worth I mean a being that 
cannot and must not be consid-
ered simply as a part related to 
some larger whole. 
This is not the place to show 
the truth of this belief that, in 
my judgment, informs the prin-
ciple of free and informed con-
sent/ Still it is inst ructive to ob-
serve that recently the philoso-
pher Roger Wertheimer expressed 
the same point by referring to 
what he termed "Standard Be-
lief," that is, the belief that " be-
ing human has moral cachet; viz., 
a human being has human status 
in virtue of being a human being 
(and thus each human being has 
human status) ."8 According to 
this Standard Belief membership 
in the human species is a morally 
significant fac t,9 and because be-
ing human has "moral cachet" it 
follows, as Ramsey has so simply 
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yet eloquently put it, that "no 
man is good enough to experi-
ment upon another without his 
consent."! O 
Yet there are instances-and 
these are by no means rare-
when it is impossible to obtain an 
adequately informed and free 
consent from the person who is 
himself to be the subject of the 
experiment. What can be done, 
what ought to be done, in such 
cases when the subject, whether 
by reason of age, mental infirmi-
ty, or physical condition, is un-
able to give consent in his or her 
own behalf? 
There is no serlO us debate 
among authorities, whether medi-
cal, legal, or moral, in cases when 
the experiment in question is de-
signed to secure some benefit for 
the person who is to be its sub-
ject, when the experiment is 
"therapeutic" at least in a broad 
sense.1I In cases of this kind con-
sent to the experiment can be 
given by others (parents, guar-
dians, etc.) in behalf of persons 
incapable of giving consent for 
themselves. Writers speak in this 
connection of "proxy" or "pre-
sumptive" or "vicarious" consent, 
and there is unanimity that in 
therapeutic sit u a t ion s such 
"proxy" consent is morally justi-
fiable. 
Some Reflections on the Debate 
But there is serious debate, at 
least among moral authorities, 
about proxy consent in the non-
therapeutic situation. Richard 
McCormick, the noted Jesuit 
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moral theologian currently serv-
ing as Kennedy Professor of 
Christian Ethics at the Center for 
Bioethics of the Kennedy Insti-
tute, recently observed that here 
there are "two identifiable schools 
of (moral) thought ... The first 
is associated with Paul Ramsey 
and is supported by William E. 
May. The second is the position 
of [Charles] Curran, [Thomas] 
O'Donnell, and myself."! 2 My 
purpose here is to offer some re-
flections on this debate in the 
hope that by doing so the deeply 
significant human values at stake 
will be clarified. I propose (1) to 
outline the position taken by 
Ramsey early in the debate; (2) 
to summarize the position advo-
cated by McCormick; (3) to note 
the objections that I originally 
raised to this position; (4) to look 
at the reply to these objections 
given by McCormick; and (5) to 
present some new reflections. 
In his Patient as Person Ram-
sey first noted that some forms 
of non therapeutic experimenta-
tion might not, in fact, "harm" a 
child (or other human subject in-
capable of giving consent in his 
own behalf). Yet he argued that 
nontherapeutic experimentations 
-that is, experimentations not 
intended to be of benefit to the 
subject but rather intended to 
advance scientific knowledge or 
benefit persons other than the ex-
perimental subject! 3 - constitute 
"offensive touching" and thus 
"wrong" the subject.!4 In develop-
ing his position Ramsey wrote as 
follows: 
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To attempt to consent for a child to 
be made an experimenta l subjec t is 
to treat a child as not a child. It is 
to trea t him as if he were an adult 
person who has consented to be-
come a joint adventurer in the com-
mon cause of medical research. If 
the grounds for this are alleged to 
be the presumptive or implied con-
sent of the child, this must simply 
be cha racterized as a violent a nd a 
fa lse presumption. Nontherapeutic. 
non-diagnostic experimentation in -
volving human subjects must be 
based on true consent if it is to pro-
ceed a s a human enterprise. No 
child or adult incompetent can 
choose to become a participating 
member of medical underta kings, 
and no one else on ea rth should de-
cide to subject these people to in-
vestigations having no relation to 
the ir own trea tment. Tha t is a can -
on of loyalty to them. This they 
claim of us simply by be ing a hu-
man child or incompetent. When he 
is grown, the child may put away 
childish things and become a true 
volunteer. This is the meaning of 
being a volunteer; tha t a man enter 
and establish a consensual rela tion 
in some joint venture for medical 
progress. I i 
In Patient as Person Ramsey 
also observed that when we use 
the term "proxy consent" to 
designate the human act involved 
in decisions to authorize thera-
peutic experiments on children 
and incompetent adults, the "con-
sent" involved is in some degree 
a "false" consent. He noted that 
to construe or presume consent in 
such cases we are by no means 
doing violence to the human be-
ing in whose behalf the "consent" 
is given, but he insisted that there 
was a degree of falsehood in using 
this expression. 16 His intent, I 
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believe, was that it is simply false 
to say that a child or incompetent 
adult is himself "consenting" to 
the therapeutic experimentation. 
In his original essay on "Proxy 
Consent in the Experimental Sit-
uation" ]7 McCormick first sought 
to find in the moral theory of 
such philosophers and theologians 
as J. de Finance, G. de Broglie, 
G. Grisez, and John Finnis the 
ultimate justification of "proxy 
consent" in the therapeutic situa-
tion. The heart of his argument, 
as he has himself recently restat-
ed it, is as follows : "if we analyze 
proxy consent where it is accept-
ed as legitimate-sci!. in the 
therapeutic situation-we will see 
that parental consent is morally 
legitimate because, life and health 
being goods of the child, he would 
choose them because he ought to 
choose the good of life. In other 
words, proxy consent [in the 
therapeutic situation] is morally 
valid precisely insofar as it is a 
reasonable presumption of the 
child's wishes, a construction of 
what the child would wish could 
he do so. The child would so 
choose because he ought to do so, 
life and health being goods defi-
nitive of his flourishing."l s 
In other words, McCormick 
sees the ultimate justification of 
"proxy consent" in the thera-
peutic situation in the reasonable-
ness of the presumption that the 
child or other incompetent would 
himself consent to the experiment 
if he could, and that he would 
consent because he ought to do so. 
McCormick then applies this 
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reasoning to the non therapeutic 
situat ion. Here he is at pains to 
reject any "utilitarian evaluation 
of children's lives that would sub-
mit their integrity to a quantity-
of-benefits calculus far beyond 
any legitimately constructed con-
sent."19 Yet McCormick holds 
that there might be some types 
of non therapeutic situations in 
which the consent of the child or 
other incompetent could be rea-
sonably presumed, if one accepts 
the analysis that he has provided 
of the rationale behind justifiable 
proxy consent in the t herapeutic 
situation. Here his position, as re-
cently summarized by McCormick 
himself, can be expressed in this 
way: 
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Once proxy consent in the thera-
peutic situation is analyzed in this 
way, the question occurs: a re there 
other things that the child ought, 
as a human being, to choose pre-
cisely because and insofar as they 
are goods definitive of his well-
being? As an answer to this question 
I have suggested that there are 
things we ought to do for others 
simply because we are members of 
the human community. These are 
not precisely works of charity or 
supererogation (beyond what is re-
quired of all of us) but our personal 
bearing of our share that a ll may 
prosper. They involve no discernible 
risk, discomfort or inconvenience, 
yet promise genuine hope for gen-
eral benefit. In summa ry, if it can 
be argued that it is a good for all 
of us to share in these experiments, 
and hence that we ought to do so 
(social justice), then a presumption 
of consent where children are in-
volved is reasonable, and proxy con-
sent becomes legitima te. 2o 
In other words McCormick first 
argues that there are moral ob- , . 
liga tions that all of us ("we") 
have as members of the human 
community to contribute to the 
"general benefit," i.e., the com-
mon good when doing so would 
entail no "discernible risk, dis-
comfort, or inconvenience." Since 
children and other incompetents 
are members of the human com-
munity, one could then reason-
ably presume that they would of 
themselves, if they could, choose 
to participate in nontherapeutic 
experiments, precisely because 
the child or other incompetent 
"ought to want this not because 
it is in any way for his own medi-
cal good, but because it is not (a) 
in any realistic way to his harm 
and (b) represents a potentially 
great benefit to others."21 
Justifying Proxy Consent 
It is very important to note, I 
believe, that McCormick's justi-
fication of proxy consent to non-
therapeutic experiments on chil-
dren and other incompetents that 
involve no discernible or minimal 
risk22 is inherently dependent for 
its validity on his analysis of the 
rationale justifying proxy consent 
in the therapeutic situation. In 
my original essay on this subject 
this was the precise point that I 
sought to stress. With Ramsey I 
believe that the term "consent," 
when applied to those instances 
when others give consent to an ex-
periment on a human being who 
is himself incapable of giving con-
sent, is in some degree false. I 
therefore argued that the justi-
fication of "proxy consent" in the 
therapeutic situat ion in no way 
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required us to "construct" the 
consent of the child or other in-
competent by inferring that he 
would, if he could, consent to t he 
experiment precisely because he 
ought to do so if he is to manifest 
the love for the good of life and 
health that is required of human 
subjects. Rather I argued that the 
basic justification for "proxy con-
sent" in the therapeutic situation 
was grounded in the moral obli-
gations incumbent on parents and 
other adult members of the hu-
man community to do what they 
could to protect the real goods of 
life and health when these were 
being imperiled in human beings 
who were themselves incapable of 
protecting these goods in them-
selves.23 In articulating my justi-
fication for proxy consent in the 
therapeutic situation I appealed 
to the Kew Gardens Principle as 
articulated by Jon Gunneman, 
Charles Powers, and John Simon 
in their The Ethical Investor.24 
According to this principle, we 
(that is, responsible adult human 
beings who are properly speaking 
moral beings or moral agents) 
have an obligation to do some-
thing in behalf of our fellow hu-
man beings when they are in need 
of help, when we are aware of the 
peril they are in (proximity), 
when we have some capacity to 
come to their assistance (capa-
bility), and when they will sure-
ly suffer or be deprived of some 
basic human good unless we take 
effective action (last resort) . 2, 
Here I want to note that I 
could have, and perhaps ought to 
have, appealed to the moral theo-
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ry of Germain Grisez to justify 
"proxy consent " in the thera-
peutic situation inasmuch as it 
was to this theory that McCor-
mick appealed in articulating his 
own position.26 Hence I now wish 
to call attention to this theory 
and the way it ought to be ap-
plied, in my judgment, to the is-
sue of proxy consent in the 
therapeutic situation. 
According to the moral theory 
of Germain Grisez and the other 
writers to whom McCormick ap-
peals, the human good is pluri-
form, that is, it consists of a set 
of real goods constitutive of what 
we can call the whole or total hu-
l11an good, and these goods are 
real and not merely apparent be-
cause they are inherently related 
to real needs rooted in our being. 
Among these goods are life and 
health. Neither life nor health or 
any of the basic human goods is 
the supreme good or summum 
bonum, but each is a real good of 
real human beings and each, . as 
known, functions as a principle of 
practical reason or what we could 
call a principle of intelligent be-
haviorY 
There are several ways, accord-
ing to this theory, in which the 
basic human goods that give rise 
to affirmative moral principles 
bind us. In his articulation of this 
theory Grisez distinguishes five 
modes of obligation. I shall note 
them here and simply point out 
that the third mode of obligation 
that he distinguishes is precisely 
the mode of obligation at stake in 
the therapeutic situation when 
the human subject is himself in-
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capable of giving consent. Accord-
ing to Grisez the basic modes of 
obligation are the following: 
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In the first place, all of these goods 
hind us at least to this, that we take 
them into account. In our practical 
reasoning, we must have a perma -
nent sensitivity to the essential 
goods to which primary principles 
direct. An attitude of simple dis-
regard for anyone of them reveals 
that we have set ourselves against 
it. Therefore, such an attitude is in-
compatible with our basic obliga-
tion to pursue and to act for it. 
In the second place, everyone of 
the goods dema nds of us that, when 
we can do so as easily as not, we 
avoid acting in ways which inhibit 
its realization and prefer ways of 
acting which contribute to its reali -
zation. This principle never can be 
applied legalistica lly , but neverthe-
less its use is quite common in prac-
tice in ordinary moral arguments. 
.. . In the third place, everyone 
of the goods demands of us that we 
make an effort on its behalf when 
its significant realization in some 
person is in extreme peril. This ob-
ligation. . frequently binds with 
great force . . . This type of obliga-
tion binds in degrees varying with 
the seriousness of the stake, the 
immediacy of the peril, and the op-
portunity we and others have for 
giving aid .... 
In the fourth place, everyone of the 
goods demands of us that we do not 
act directly against its realiza-
tion . ... 
Still another, the fifth way, in which 
the values establish obligations is 
that each one of them demands of 
us that we keep our engagements 
with it. We do not have a general 
obligation to seek out opportunities 
for promoting everyone of the 
goods. But we should pursue some-
thing good, and each person accord-
ing to his individual aptitude must 
choose the values he will try to pro-
mote .... 28 
It ought to be obvious, r be-
lieve, that the third mode of ob-
ligation is the mode of obligation 
at stake in situations when so-
called "proxy consent" is given in 
the therapeutic situation. It is 
simply a way of stating the "Kew 
Gardens Principle" adopting the 
moral theory of Germain Grisez, 
the moral theory to which Mc-
Cormick appealed in articulating 
his position. 
To summarize at this point. r 
believe that the basic reason why 
it is morally legitimate for a par-
ent or other adult to "consent" to 
allow his child or other incom-
petent human being to participate 
in a therapeutic experiment is 
simply that the consent in such 
cases is an exercise of proper 
moral responsibility by a mor-
al agent of the obligation that 
he has to promote the good of an-
other human being when this good 
is imperiled and he has the ca-
pacity of doing something about 
it. There is no need for him to 
construct the child's wishes or to 
presume that the child would of 
himself consent to the procedure 
if he could because of any moral 
obligation on his part to do so. 
r objected to the position of Mc-
Cormick inasmuch as I thought 
that his analysis of the justifica-
tion for proxy consent in the 
therapeutic situation was inac-
curate and, a fortiori, that his 
analysis of the justification for 
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proxy consent in the nonthera-
peutic situation was erroneous. I 
claimed that his position requires 
one to treat a child or other in-
competent moral individual as a 
moral agent, something that a 
child or other incompetent, sim-
ply by being a child or incom-
petent, certainly is not. 29 
In commenting on the objec-
tions brought against his position 
McCormick made two points. His 
first was that the position he ar-
ticulated does not "necessarily re-
gard the infant as a moral agent. 
Nor need it," he wrote, "imply 
that he has obligations. It need 
only suggest that what it is rea-
sonable and legitimate to do ex-
perimentally wit h youngsters 
might be constructed off what 
others who are moral agents 
ought as humans to do; for 
though they are not yet moral 
agents, infants are humans in the 
fullest sense. "30 
As far as the first element in 
McCormick's first point is con-
cerned-namely that his position 
need not imply that an infant has 
moral obligations-it seems to me 
that in articulating his position he 
not only implied that the infant 
has moral obligations but asserted 
that he did. For he wrote: "proxy 
consent is morally valid precisely 
insofar as it is a reasonable pre-
sumption of the child's wishes, a 
construction of what the child 
would wish could he do so. The 
child would so choose because he 
ought to do SO. "31 If this is not to 
presume or infer or construct 
moral obligations existing in the 
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child, then I have difficulty in 
grasping what it is. 
Further Observations 
With respect to McCormick's 
claim that his position "need only 
suggest that what is reasonable 
and legitimate to do experi-
mentally with youngsters might 
be constructed off what others 
who are moral agents ought as 
humans to do ; for though they 
are not yet moral agents, infants 
are humans in the fullest sense" 
I would like to offer the following 
observations. 
With McCormick I believe that 
infants and adult incompetents 
are humans in the fullest sense. 
But I believe that we need to 
make some distinctions when we 
speak of what we as humans 
ought to do. I believe that I do 
not, precisely as a human being, 
as a member of the human spe-
cies, have any moral obligations. 
Yet I do believe that I am, pre-
cisely as member of the human 
species, as a human being, a be-
ing of moral worth , an image of 
God, a being of whom it is written 
"Does a woman forget her baby 
at the breast, or fail to cherish the 
son of her womb? Yet even if she 
forgets, I will never forget you. 
See, I have branded you on the 
palms of my hands" (Is 49:15-
16) . As a human being, as a 
member of the human species, I 
am radically capable of becoming 
a moral agent, a being with moral 
obligations, but in order for me 
to become such an entity I need 
help of the human community. 
Let me now try to explain why, 
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and why I believe this character 
of our existence is so central to 
the issue of proxy consent in the 
nontherapeutic situation. 
No one in this room-no hu-
man being anywhere--was a 
moral being or moral agent at 
birth. No one in this room, no 
human being anywhere, was a per-
son or personal subject at birth, 
if by person or personal subject 
one means a self-conscious entity 
aware of itself as a self, as an en-
during subject of experiences, ca-
pable of communicating with 
other persons, other selves, and 
capable of distinguishing between 
is and ought. Empirical evidence 
is relevant and determinative 
here. There have been, for ex-
ample, recorded instances of feral 
or "wolf" children, that is, human 
infants separated from a human 
community quite early in their 
lives who were then reared by ani-
mals such as wolves or bears. 
When these human offspring-
beings certainly human by reason 
of their membership in the human 
species and in my judgment (and 
in Christian faith) infinitely pre-
cious beings imaging the living 
God-were found by other human 
beings and brought back into the 
human community, it was evident 
that they did not have any reali-
zation or awareness of themselves 
as selves. They totally lacked the 
concept of selfhood-indeed they 
were completely incapable of en-
tertaining any concepts. They 
were, in brief, quite oblivious to 
their own identity as human be-
ings and obviously they were in 
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no way bearers of moral obliga-
tions. 
What this fact (and others like 
it) does, I suggest, is to make us 
acutely conscious of the social 
solidarity of human existence. 
They show us that human exist-
ence, as a personal existence, is 
inescapably and necessarily a co-
existence, or to use a biblical ex-
pression, that human existence is 
convental in character. To be hu-
man in the sense that to be 
human means being personal and 
being a self aware of its respon-
sibilities is to exist with other hu-
man beings. But for us to exist 
with other human beings we must 
first be granted leave by them to 
exist with them. Personhood, in 
other words, is a gift. It is, in a 
very real sense and in one respect, 
a gift that each one of us receives 
from other human beings (al-
though ultimately God is the 
source of our personhood). It is 
a gift that we receive, directly and 
immediately, from the parents 
who conceived us in an act that 
was at the very same time, one 
hopes, an act expressive of the 
love they had for one another, 
and it is a gift that we continually 
are called upon to bestow on one 
another. My being me depends, in 
a very real way, on your being you 
and allowing me to be me. An in-
dispensable prerequisite for our 
becoming persons is the help of 
the human community. We must 
first be recognized by that com-
munity for what we are, namely 
beings of moral worth, if we are 
to grow into personhood. 
Perhaps I could express some-
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what more clearly what I have in 
mind if I reformulate somewhat 
the strikingly perceptive formula-
tion of the Golden Rule suggested 
by Roger Wertheimer in the essay 
to which I referred earlier. 32 I 
submit the following: You, a mor-
al being (i.e., a personal subject 
capable of rational reflection and 
of exercising moral responsibility 
and of being the bearer of moral 
obligations) are to do unto others 
(i.e., other members of the human 
species, other beings of moral 
worth) as you, a member of the 
human species and a being of 
moral worth, would have others 
(i.e., other moral beings, other 
personal subjects capable of ra-
tional reflection and of exercising 
moral responsibility and of being 
the bearers of moral obligations) 
do unto you, a member of the hu-
man species, a being of moral 
worth. 
Apply this now to the instances 
when "proxy consent" is at stake. 
In the therapeutic situation those 
human beings who have become 
moral agents and bearers of moral 
obligations (and have become so 
because they have at least been 
allowed to be and have been in 
some way recognized for they 
really are by the human com-
munity) find themselves faced 
with a moral obligation to do 
what they rightly can to help one 
of their fellow human beings (a 
being of moral worth) participate 
in the true human goods of life 
and health. In the non therapeutic 
situation, the same human beings 
are stilI required to recognize in 
an infant or other incompetent 
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human being the reality that is 
present to them and demanding 
of them that it be recognized as 
the entity that it really is. To au-
thorize that this human being 
participate in an experiment that. 
is in no way related to his own 
well-being and in which he is re-
quired to participate simply 
because he can provide an indis-
pensable ingredient for the ex-
periment to work is, I submit, an 
act that ruptures the convenantal 
bonds that ought to exist in and 
among human beings, for it is to 
regard this human subject, this 
being of moral worth , either as an 
impersonal "it" or as a bearer of 
moral obligations, neither of 
which he is. 
To put it another way, I believe 
that proxy consent in nonthera-
peutic situations is morally un-
justifiable precisely because it 
strikes at the very heart of the 
belief or supposition that lies be-
hind the principle of free and in-
formed consent to begin with, 
namely that human beings are all , 
simply by reason oi their member-
ship in the human species, beings 
of moral worth and as such en-
tities that transcend the com-
munities in which they exist. 
"Offensive Touching" 
A second point that McCor-
mick raised in commenting on the 
objections raised to his position 
was the following: "At some point 
the discussion must come to grips 
with the fact that Ramsey's posi-
tion (,offensive touching')-the 
one preferred by May-could not 
allow any non therapeutic experi-
mentation whatsoever, even the 
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most trivial such as a bucca! 
smear or routine weighing."33 Let 
us seek to come to grips with this. 
A buccal smear, as I understand 
it, is tissue taken from human 
cheeks for examination. I do not 
know whether such buccal smears 
are routinely done on infants, but 
if so, I believe that one ought seri-
ously to question the practice un-
less it is being done to help or 
in some way benefit the infants 
whose cheek tissue is being used 
for examination. Similarly, if the 
weighing of infants is in no way 
related to their well-being, then 
why is this act performed? Surely 
anyone of us, and I would im-
agine McCormick would here be 
included, would be "offended" if 
someone were to take tissue from 
our cheeks or put us on a scale 
simply out of curiosity and with -
out asking our permission. It 
would be an affront to our dig-
nity, to our humanity. Infants, I 
submit, and McCormick agrees 
with me here, are humans in the 
fullest sense and ought to be re-
spected as such. If a buccal smear 
or weighing is in no way related 
to their own well being, are they 
not being offensively touched? 
Does the inoffensiveness reside 
simply in the minds of those who 
perform such acts, and is this not 
the result of their own insensi-
tivity? Does it represent the prop-
er "care" that human beings who 
are moral agents ought to exercise 
in behalf of those human beings 
who are not? Could such activity 
be made to conform to the Golden 
Rule as herein articulated? 
The suggestion has been made 
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that the position taken by Ram-
sey and me is too individualistic 
and does not give serious atten-
tion to the social character of our 
existence.34 I believe that quite 
the contrary is true. I agree fully 
with McCormick when he speaks 
of the responsibilities that "we" 
have as members of the human 
community to do our part to con-
tribute to the general benefit or 
common good. The obligatory 
character of these responsibilities 
is indeed extremely stringent, as 
a careful consideration of the 
third mode of obligation of which 
Grisez speaks would indicate. But 
I submit that our responsibilities 
toward the human community in -
clude the obligation that "we," 
that is, moral agents and moral 
beings, have to protect the in-
tegrity and inviolability of those 
beings of moral worth who are 
fully our fellow human beings but 
who are not, precisely because 
they are children or incompetents, 
our fellow moral agents charged, 
with us, with the responsibility to 
contribute to the general benefit. 
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